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* My professional opinion is based upon over 25 years experience which included serving as a NTSB investigator, FAA scientist, Navy psychologist, as well as a design engineer for two firms.  My extensive post-graduate work and doctoral dissertation focused on safety.  I also served in the Air Force Reserves after completing Army airborne training.

Alan Diehl to Pres. Clinton

"To the living we owe respect, to the dead we owe the truth."

--Alan E. Diehl

When the Air Force failed to act on the warnings of its own safety director--and when Congress failed to act on the warnings of another Air Force safety official--there was only one place to turn: the White House. So Air Force whistle-blower Alan Diehl sent a letter last fall to President Clinton calling his attention to "shocking examples [that] illustrate the three basic problems with our military accident investigation system":   1) investigations are not independent; 2) inquiries are not directed by professional investigators; and 3) this system allows embarrassing information to be concealed. Diehl's letter (below) calls for a comprehensive independent review of military safety systems. To date, no such review has occurred.

Dr. Alan E. Diehl

Albuquerque New Mexico

September 7, l996

President William J. Clinton

The White House

Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Sir, last Memorial Day at Arlington National Cemetery you eloquently eulogized our service members who have been killed by accidents.  You reminded us all that, like their comrades killed in action, they too were heroes.  Tragically, during the past l 5 years over l 5,000 military personnel have died in mishaps, while only 600 were killed by combat or terrorism.  Military operations are innately hazardous, but many unnecessary accidents result from inadequate safety provisions.  This is wrong, and it must stop.

As the senior civilian advisor for the Air Force Safety Agency, I was appalled by the widespread naivete and indifference to fundamental accident investigation and prevention principles.*  During my seven years there, I observed a wide variety of problems including bungled investigations, intentional cover-ups, scapegoating, deceptive cost accounting schemes, and ignored safety recommendations.  Thus, in October 1994, after conferring with Army and Navy colleagues, I sent a detailed memorandurn to the Secretary of Defense and the Congressional Arrned Services Committees.

Unfortunately, little has been done to redress such problems since my complaint was filed almost two years ago.  Additional losses have consequently occurred, including almost l,000 deaths and five billion dollars wasted.  Aside from the grim statistics we have witnessed many human tragedies. Examples include the Air Force's irnprudence which caused the death of Secretary Ronald Brown, and the Navy's lax procedures which allowed Lt Commander John Bates to crash his F-14 into a Nashville neighborhood.  In addition, last year's Senate hearings into the Army's cover-up of the Gulf War fratricide incident that killed Corporal Lance Fielder revealed these abuses are not limited to aviation.

On May 29, l995 a Time Magazine article described military safety problems along with my plea to reform the system.  Because of the ensuing media coverage, many people have contacted me.  Some were family members of the victims who wanted to know why our government continues to ignore these problems.  Their concerns, and the dangers to our military personnel, compel me to personally notify you and key members of Congress.

I continue to encounter highly disturbing information.  For instance, I recently received data on the death of the Navy's first female fighter pilot, Lt Kara Hultgreen.  The official report indicated she died after her F-14's left engine failed during a carrier landing.  However, photographs of the aircraft wreckage revealed two large bombracks mounted under its fuselage, which the official report did not discuss.  These racks were installed because the Navy wanted to use the F-l4 as a bomber.  The racks made the aircraft less stable, especially when her jet yawed violently after its engine failed.  Only minimal testing is done on such modifications.  This raises questions on whether the Navy wanted to ignore potentially embarrassing information.

An Army H-60 crashed near Cyprus in August l995, after losing one of its engines.  All four crewmembers were killed.  I was distressed to hear this exact type of engine failure had occurred l50 times in the previous six years, but the Army was ignoring these problems.  They had delayed fixing these engines.

I was also contacted after the F-1l7 Stealth fighter crashed in May l995, killing Captain Kenneth Levens.  His father asked me what had caused the accident.  I explained how my memorandum had specifically described F-1l7 cockpit ergonomic deficiencies, and that such problems were undoubtedly a factor in the mishap.  This was not surprising given the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General Report (Number 94-l24) which concluded that Air Force program managers do not adequately address human systems integration issues in most weapon systems. Unfortunately, such deficiencies are often overlooked in military investigations because of the amateurish way they are conducted.

These shocking examples illustrate the three basic problems with our current military accident investigation system:

First, investigations are not independent.  Junior officers can not be expected to objectively investigate their superiors.  Such investigations often ignore management's critical role in accident causation.

Second, inquiries are not directed by professional investigators.  Using line-officers to do investigations (as an additional duty or a temporary assignment) is dangerous, because overlooked information can result in tragic recurrences.

Third, this system allows embarrassing information to be concealed from senior military leaders, your Administration, our Congress, the next-of-kin, and the public.  The Pentagon contends such data is protected by "executive privilege".  Thus, only the information from separate, less definitive, judicial investigations is currently released, (along with the obvious factual data).

Because of these deficiencies, military mishap investigations often focus on superficial symptoms such as 'pilot error", while ignoring the underlying systemic problems like equipment design, training, supervision, and the operational environments.  Consequently, most mishap rates have changed little since my memorandum was filed.  Moreover, recent Pentagon efforts to address its problems with "safety stand-downs", and the Air Force "blue ribbon panel" have produced only limited benefits.

The focused analysis of military executive aircraft problems that you recently demanded is laudable, but a global examination is also warranted.  A comprehensive, independent, review of our entire military safety system is urgentb needed.  To do less would be a national disgrace.   Your Administration and Congress should cooperate to decisively attack these problems.

Having spent many years studying such issues, I would recommend several actions.  But these ideas are not mine alone.  They include the concerns and hopes of many people: witnesses, other experts. and victims; some of whose views are reflected in the attached letters and articles.

First, let me solicit your support for several potential Congressional undertakings.  The Congressional General Accounting Office (GAO) should examine certain DoD safety issues.  The GAO has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to objectively investigate safety deficiencies, and cover-ups involving particular mishaps.

For instance, they uncovered the truth after the Navy attempted to blame the Battleship Iowa explosion on a "homosexual" sailor.  The GAO will also soon issue their report on the underlying causes of the friendly-fire downing of our two Army helicopters over Iraq.  (Please note, I was removed from the Air Force's inquiry into this tragedy after complaining about a cover-up.)

The GAO should examine the flawed DoD cost accounting schemes.  Pentagon assumptions dramatically understate their direct losses.  For instance, they use $16 per hour in figuring direct labor repair costs, although the actual rates are often several times that amount.  Furthermore, their system simply ignores some very significant indirect costs, such as so-called "attrition aircraft".  Thus, the DoD data suggesting the annual costs of all types of mishaps averages about three billion dollars, vastly understates the real costs to our taxpayers.

The GAO should also investigate unreported or mis-reported accidents.  The current publicity on military safety problems seems to have actually increased the number of such cases in recent years.  For instance, there were three Air Force cases in l994, but there were several more instances of this last year.  It also appears that more accidents are now being concealed by a variety of other subterfuges, such as replacing damaged parts with spares, but not reporting their costs.

The recent GAO statistical study (NSIAD-96-69BR) was interesting, because it showed certain long-term improvements in military aviation safety.  But it was based upon the flawed information generated by the services investigating themselves in the first place.  Congress wisely made the National Transportation Safety Board an independent agency in 1974, and they have required the Board to investigate almost all non-DoD government transportation accidents since 1994.  Investigating military accidents poses a unique challenge.  Congress should therefore establish an independent "Military Safety Board". This agency would replace the three existing safety center functions.  Such an organization is necessary to efficiently conduct timely, objective, and accurate investigations.  This board should report directly to the President and the Armed Services Committees.

Obviously, your support in requesting such a board would be invaluable.  You might also convene a Presidential Commission to deal with other military safety issues.  Potential topics include: how best to insure the board's recommendations are evaluated and implemented, how to integrate safety considerations in equipment acquisition, where to implement safety training in military organizations, and how to establish safety career fields for military officers.  Lastly, you should consider issuing an Executive Order directing all military personnel and civilian employees to fully cooperate and support these safety enhancement activities.

Defenders of the status quo may suggest that military operations are inherently dangerous, and such intrusions would be just too disruptive.  They would have us accept the current situation, with the accompanying losses.  These critics should examine the Pentagon's near perfect record in handling nuclear weapons.  When commanders are asked to do so, things can be made much safer, but only if they are given the tools.  DoD personnel are very capable and dedicated.  Once these changes are made, they will quickly adapt to their new responsibilities.

Furthermore, a well-designed safety program will be highly cost-effective, and thus enhance mission accomplishment.  Our taxpayers and service members deserve nothing less.  But perhaps the most persuasive reason for making these reforms are Voltaire's words: "To the living we owe respect, to the dead we owe the truth."

Respectfully yours,

Alan E. Diehl, Ph.D.

3708 Calle Castano NE

Albuquerque, NM 87111-4334