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This story was produced by the Oregon Journalism Project, a nonprofit newsroom covering the state.
A yet-to-be-released analysis of the proposed new Interstate Bridge provides the clearest view yet of how tolling, which is central to any effort to fund and build the public works project across the Columbia River, could affect traffic numbers—and the project’s funding shortfall.
It’s a matter of statewide importance for Oregonians, given that the interstate crossing is an economic artery not only for commuters but truck freight from Ontario to Ashland and every Oregon city and town in between.
Tolling Interstate 5 between the two states has long been a crucial element of the Interstate Bridge Replacement Program’s financial plan. The current study—an “investment grade analysis”—is the most rigorous look at how much cash tolling revenues would generate and therefore how much the bi-state project can borrow against those future revenues.
The $2.3 million analysis, conducted by the engineering firm Stantec, evaluated four different tolling scenarios. Although the analysis has not yet been completed, Portland economist Joe Cortright, a longtime critic of the bridge replacement project, obtained some of the key aspects of Stantec’s work through a public records request. He shared the documents with OJP.
The documents show that traffic across the bridge will drop dramatically when tolling begins. The study’s calculations show that crossings over a tolled bridge could plunge by 50,000 vehicles—more than one-third of the 134,000 cars that officials say cross the I-5 bridge today.
A project spokeswoman confirms the Stantec analysis does indeed show a large drop in daily traffic but says the numbers are a worst-case scenario. “Estimates for this financial analysis include an additional layer of conservatism to allow for a period of transition as the community adjusts to tolling,” she says.
Cortright says a big chunk of those 50,000 displaced vehicles are likely to shift east to the Glenn Jackson Bridge on Interstate 205, which also crosses the Columbia but will not be tolled.
The estimated traffic will initially be far below the planned capacity of the new bridge, which is being designed to carry 180,000 vehicles per day. To Cortright, that means the bridge is too big. The project spokeswoman says the structure is being built to last 75 to 100 years and so must be able to accommodate growth.
Traffic won’t return to current levels for decades, according to Stantec’s analysis. As a result, the estimated revenue from tolls will not come close to filling the project’s funding gap.
The analysis says tolls ranging from $2 (off peak) to $4.70 (rush hour) will allow the project to borrow $1.72 billion.
Given project cost escalations, that $1.72 billion is not nearly enough to fill the large gap between the $4.2 billion in state and federal funding currently committed to the project and the project’s price tag.
That inconvenient truth comes three months after OJP reported that the total project cost (which includes improving all the freeway ramps for five miles around the bridge and extending light rail to Vancouver) more than doubled from the previous estimate of $6 billion in 2022.
That new escalation shifted the narrative from both state’s leaders. After years of talking about the necessity of doing the entire five-mile project at once, the governors are now talking about doing the work piecemeal.
Project officials caution against drawing too many conclusions from Stantec’s tolling projections.
“The traffic and revenue analysis work is an exercise to determine revenue projections and takes a fiscally conservative approach,” the project spokeswoman says. “[That] tends to project lower bridge usage so as to not overstate revenue potential.”
But state Rep. Thuy Tran (D-Portland), a member of the bi-state IBR oversight committee, reacted negatively to the new information from the Stantec analysis, which she says shows the two states cannot afford the project on the drawing board.
“Lawmakers are being asked to advance the largest infrastructure project in state history without a defensible plan to pay for it or a clear understanding of the full long-term costs,” Tran says. “As a member of the committee charged with oversight, I have growing doubts that this project can be delivered without putting the rest of Oregon’s transportation system at risk.”
